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When democracy is new, it is often fragile and not fully consolidated. We investigate how the danger
of a collapse of democracy may affect fiscal policy in new democracies in comparison to countries
where democracy is older and often more established. We argue that the attitude of the citizenry towards
democracy is important in preventing democratic collapse, and expenditures may therefore be used
to convince them that "democracy works". We present a model focusing on the inference problem
that citizens solve in forming their beliefs about the efficacy of democracy. Our approach differs from
much of the literature that concentrates on policy directed towards anti-democratic elites, but our model
can encompass that view and allows comparison of different apporoaches. We argue that the implications
of the model are broadly consistent with the empirical patterns generally observed, including the existence
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The 1990s saw a wave of democratization (Huntington’s [1993] “third wave”) as numerous coun-
tries moved from non-democratic to democratic regimes. These new democracies faced many chal-
lenges, among which were coping with the large structural changes that accompanied the change in
political regime, as well as persuading the public that the economy functioned after these changes.
Surely one of the largest challenges these new democracies faced was the possible fragility of the
new regime and the need to consolidate democracy itself. “Established” democracies can (and do)
take the stability of basic political structures for granted. Such is not the case in countries where
democracy is a new (or even a “renewed”) phenomenon and where the survival of the new political
institutions is far from guaranteed.
Fragility or lack of consolidation of democracy refers to a situation in which some crucial political
groups, including perhaps the general public, lack full commitment to the democratic process. This
lack of widespread commitment to democracy makes it more vulnerable to anti-democratic elites. As
Linz and Stepan (1996, p.5) put it, consolidation refers to “a political situation in which, in a phrase,
democracy has become ‘the only game in town.’ Behaviorally, democracy becomes the only game in
town when no signiﬁcantpoliticalgroupsseriouslyattempttoov erthrowthedemocraticregime...” 1
The fragility of democracy in countries that have recently made the transition to democracy raises
an obvious question for economists: What economic policies can a government choose to try to help
consolidate democracy?
A common view of the problem of democratic fragility is that the threat to democracy comes
from anti-democratic elites – the army, groups such as the wealthy who beneﬁtted most under the
old regime, the “oligarchs”. These are the groups who are seen as basically anti-democratic and who
have the power to overthrow the new democratic regime. Focussing on the elites leads to a simple
answer to the basic question posed at the end of the previous paragraph. Democratic consolida-
tion requires economic policies that induce the anti-democratic elites not to overthrow democracy.
That is, economic policy consistent with democracy must placate the elites, or, colloquially but not
inaccurately, to “buy them oﬀ.”
The clearest and best worked-out example of this approach is in the work of Acemoglu and
Robinson, for example in Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2005):
1An alternative deﬁnition is that of Schedler (1998, p. 103) that “the concept of a ‘consolidated democracy’ should
describe a democratic regime that relevant observers expect to last well into the future—and nothing else.” Since such
expectations are likely to be formed on the basis of the probability that there will be successful challenges to the regime,
this is consistent with our modeling of the probability of the survival of democracy.
1In building our theory of coups, we will emphasize the same economic and political
incentives that featured prominently in understanding the creation of democracy. So
far we have emphasized that in democratic societies the majority of citizens are able to
alter policies in their favor and against the interests of elites. This makes the citizens
pro-democratic while simultaneously giving the elite an incentive to oppose democracy.
... The same basic forces will also determine the incentives for coups. Since the elite
prefer nondemocracy to democracy, they may, under certain circumstances, support a
coup against democracy, which would lead to policies more favorable to themselves in the
future.
The key assumption is that the citizenry is unambiguously in favor of democracy, the implication
being that policy should focus on the elites. In studying the political economy of democratic consol-
idation, Acemoglu and Robinson then focus on the constraints put on ﬁscal policy by preventing the
elites from trying to overthrow democracy.
In this paper we argue that while anti-democratic elites are clearly central to the understanding of
coups, the assumption that the citizenry unambiguously supports democracy (and the implied focus
almost exclusively on elites that this assumption leads to) misses some crucial issues in the process
of democratic consolidation. In new democracies there is often large public skepticism of whether
democracy “works”, that is, whether it delivers the political and economic stability of the old regime.
As we document in section 2.2, the data show signiﬁcantly weaker support for democracy among the
general population in new than in established democracies. Hence simply assuming that the citizenry
supports democracy misses a key problem of democratic consolidation, namely the implications of
public skepticism about democracy for its survival. Public discontent with democracy may strengthen
anti-democratic elites, who may be unable to overthrow democracy in absence of public dissatisfaction
of some sort.
A main challenge of policy is thus aﬀecting public attitudes about democracy, especially at critical
points of vulnerability of the democratic system, such as around elections. We further argue that
looking at public perceptions of democracy as one of the key challenges of policy in new democracies
may help us better understand some aspects of the evolution of ﬁscal policy in new democracies than
would a sole focus on the elites. We are not saying that the arguments made by those who focus
on elites in the consolidation process are incorrect or uninformative, but that this focus needs to
be supplemented by consideration of the citizenry to better understand the policy implications of
democratic fragility. More speciﬁcally, we argue that the incentives for an anti-democratic elite to
stage a coup reﬂect both the expected beneﬁt to the elite if the coup succeeds and their evaluation of
the probability of success, which is negatively correlated with the general public’s satisfaction with
the functioning of democracy.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we set out in greater detail the impor-
2tance of public attitudes towards democracy in the consolidation process. In section 3 we present
a formal model concentrating on the importance of aﬀecting public perceptions of democracy and
derive some implications for both the timing and magnitude of ﬁscal policy actions in new democra-
cies. Speciﬁcally, government spending and deﬁcits will increase in times of democratic vulnerability
and this increase may be quite substantial, depending on underlying parameter values. Section 4
presents evidence on ﬁscal policy consistent with the focus on aﬀecting public attitudes. Among
other things, we show that election years are points of democratic vulnerability, so that the demo-
cratic consolidation could imply a political budget cycle, but not because they help incumbents get
re-elected (which other research of ours suggest they do not). We therefore suggest that problems
of democratic consolidation may shed light on the empirical ﬁnding of Brender and Drazen (2005a)
that political budget cycles are a phenomenon of new democracies but not established ones, but that
increases in election-year deﬁcits do not appear to help incumbents get re-elected. We also consider
the composition of large election-year expenditure increases to argue that they are not directed solely
at elites. Section 5 presents conclusions.
2 Democratic Consolidation and Public Perception of Democracy
2.1 The importance of the citizenry in the survival of democracy
Our argument on importance of the citizenry is that their attitudes towards the new democratic
system may be crucial in determining whether democracy withstands anti-democratic pressure and
survives. Though anti-democratic elites may have the interest in overthrowing democracy, their
ability to do so depends on the attitudes of the citizenry towards democracy. Anti-democratic elites
may be generally unable to successfully overthrow democracy without support from the citizenry (if
only their lack of active opposition to reversion). Or, public unrest and dissatisfaction may provide
the pretext for military intervention, supported by anti-democratic elites, to overthrow democracy
and “restore order”. The classic case in which lack of public commitment to democracy played a
major role in its collapse is the Weimar Republic, but it is not the only example where public attitudes
were important.2
This perhaps simple observation, when combinedw i t ht h ep o s s i b i l i t yt h a tt h em a s s e sm a yn o t
be unambiguously convinced of the value of democracy, implies a quite signiﬁcant change in how one
should think about the use of economic policy to ensure the survival of democracy. It is no longer the
2Bermeo (1993) presents a large number of case studies, both where public support was a major factor and where it
was not.
3case that policy should be aimed simply at “buying oﬀ” the elites. If some degree of support from
citizens is crucial to the overthrow of democracy, policy must also be aimed at ensuring their support
for democracy, thus making a coup and a democratic collapse less likely or perhaps impossible.
This approach thus forces a reconsideration of the assumption that the interest of the masses is
unambiguously in favor of democracy. Conditional (rather than unconditional) support on the part
of the citizenry is consistent with the focus in the literature on the importance of public attitudes
about the eﬃcacy of democracy.3 Eﬃcacy clearly has economic dimensions and if citizens do not
believe that democracy is able to solve economic problems, this may be fatal for democracy. In new
democracies the eﬃciency of the new political system, and not just its legitimacy, becomes a crucial
issue. As Linz and Stepan (p. 80) put it
The key question for the democracies is whether their citizens believe that, in the
circumstances, the democratic government is doing a credible job in trying to overcome
economic problems. It is important to stress that the political economy of legitimacy
will produce severe and perhaps insoluble challenges to democratic consolidation in those
cases where the democratic system itself is judged to be incapable of producing a program
to overcome the economic crisis.
While belief in eﬃcacy by the citizens is crucial, beliefs can change over time. In summarizing
the experience of the new democracies of Southern Europe, Linz and Stepan write (p. 144)
... the overwhelming majority of consolidated democracies did not actually begin
their transition to democracy with a majority of members of the polity or even many of
the key agents of the transition being either convinced democrats or citizens who rejected
everything about the past regime. Rather, a democratic majority emerges when elites
and ordinary citizens alike begin to evaluate, for the societal problems they then face
and the overall world within which they then live, that democratic procedures of conﬂict
regulation are better or less dangerous than any other form of governance. Thus, for
many key elites democratic behavior emerges before democratic attitudes because elites
may make the calculation that breaking the democratic rules of the game — whether they
like them or not — will not yield a positive outcome for their interests. Democracy becomes
the “only game in town” partly by belief and partly by elite calculation of the cost of
compliance versus the cost of mobilization for other governing alternatives. (italics ours)
Note further that the transition to democracy is often associated with large structural changes
in the economy. This was particularly noticeable in the formerly socialist economies of Eastern
Europe but also in Southern Europe and in some Latin American countries. The twin transitions
may thus imply an especially great need to show that the economic system functions under the new
arrangements. In order to concentrate on the ﬁscal implications of showing that democracy works,
in our modeling we abstract away from any direct eﬀect of the economic transition on ﬁscal policy,
though large structural changes will be a key reason for the diﬃc u l t yi nd r a w i n gi n f e r e n c e sa b o u t
how well the system functions. (See section 2.3 below.)
3See, for example, the wide-ranging survey of Linz and Stepan (1996).
42.2 Evidence on public attitudes
Recent data from the World Values Survey (Inglehart, 2004) support the view that ordinary
citizens in new democracies are not unconditional supporters of democracy. We tabulated diﬀerences
in the responses between new and old democracies (as deﬁned in Brender and Drazen [2005a]) and
after controlling for characteristics such as per-capita income and the age-structure of the population,
investigated what signiﬁcant diﬀerences remained in answers to the survey questions. These results
from equations based on the mean values for each country are summarized in Table 1. We note
three diﬀerences between the responses in new and old democracies that may help explain policy
diﬀerences between new and established democracies. In new democracies: 1) democracy is less
consolidated; 2) people appear to be more tolerant of manipulation; and, 3) people care more about
good economic performance. (This last diﬀerence is consistent with the empirical work in Brender
and Drazen [2005b] on the stronger eﬀect of economic growth on re-election probabilities in new
versus old democracies.)
In this paper we focus on the ﬁrst diﬀerence, but the second and especially the third suggest how
policy may be used to consolidate democracy. Other studies ﬁnd that the survival of democracy is
quite sensitive to economic performance. Przeworski, et al.(2000) ﬁnd empirically that better growth
performance makes a democracy more likely to survive, while poor economic performance makes both
presidential and parliamentary systems more vulnerable. Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom, (2003)
ﬁnd this to be true especially prior to the third legislative election. Many other authors make similar
observations (see, for example, Linz and Stepan [1978] or Remmer [1996].)4
The ﬁndings in Table 1 are conﬁrmed in when we estimate similar equations at the individual
level, looking for diﬀerences between individuals who live in new and old democracies (Table 1A). In
addition to country characteristics, we also control in these equations for various individual charac-
teristics such as age, gender, the individual’s income level, and religion.
[Put Tables 1 and 1A Here]
Individual level data also conﬁrm the widely held presumption that within new democracies, it
is older citizens who express greater doubts about the value of democracy, as summarized in Figure
1, where we show attitudes about democracy in new democracies relative to established ones across
age groups.
[Put Figure 1 Here]
4It is often argued that the survival of authoritarian regimes is also sensitive, perhaps even more so, to perceptions of
their ability to deliver good economic performance. This observation in no way invalidates the sensitivity of democratic
regimes to economic performance, our subject of interest.
52.3 Information about policies
We also note that there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between new and old democracies in the
World Values Survey in responses on people’s exposure to politics or news at the country level, as
seen in Table 1 (though there may be less “ﬁscal content” in the news). In fact, the results at the
individual level in Table 1A suggest that people in new democracies tend to follow politics in the
media more than those in old ones. Similar exposure to politics and news does not however mean
that citizens have similar quality information about how well the economy works. This distinction is
crucial to our modeling of policy in new versus established democracies.5
More speciﬁcally, we argue that in new democracies, citizens have less information about ﬁscal
outcomes, as well as less understanding of the political process generating ﬁscal policy. This would
reﬂect experience with the electoral process by voters, the establishment of the institutions that would
collect and provide the relevant data, and experience by media in disseminating and analyzing this
information. The combination of limited experience with democracy and limited ﬁscal information
make it more diﬃcult for citizens in new democracies to see through ﬁscal policies meant to convince
them that democracy is working.
The diﬃculty in analyzing economic and ﬁscal developments in new democracies is not limited
to less availability of information. Due to the substantial structural changes in the economy which
often accompany the transition to democracy, it is likely that the interpretation of observable data
becomes more complicated. To examine the possible eﬀect on ﬁscal policy of such changes, we
considered changes in the composition of government expenditures in a panel of 70 countries during
the period 1970-2004. We found that changes in the composition of government expenditures in new
democracies were 60-65 percent larger than in established ones.6 Consequently, when citizens in new
democracies observe improvements in the public services they receive — or higher transfer payments -
it is more diﬃcult for them to infer whether these reﬂect a more eﬃcient allocation of public resources
(as part of the transition process) or ﬁscal manipulation via deﬁcit spending.7
Information problems are so important because fragility alone is not suﬃcient to explain the use
of ﬁscal policy to aﬀect attitudes about democracy; it is the combination of fragility and imperfect
5Brender (2003) shows that the development of information sources about ﬁscal performance and the means to
deliver them to the public had a substantial eﬀect on the response of citizens to such information.
6We decomposed the GFS data on central government spending to 9 categories (by function) and created an index of
the annual change of this composition by summing the absolute values of the changes in the shares of all the categories
and dividing the total by 2. Based on 988 observations (of which 349 were from new democracies) we found that
the index for new democracies is 6.6 and for established democracies 4.0. Using 12 expenditure categories (with 836
observations) the average change among new democracies was 7.5 and among the established ones 4.5.
7The diﬃculty in making inferences from observable ﬁs c a ld a t au n d e r l i e sm a n ym o d e l so ft r y i n gt oi n ﬂunce voters,
beginnig with Rogoﬀ and Sibert (1988) and Rogoﬀ (1990).
6inference about ﬁscal policy that is key to why policy in new democracies is diﬀerent. Newness
implies incomplete information about how the economic system will function under democracy (and
how democracy itself works). Hence, expenditures to strengthen the public’s perception of a well-
functioning system — for example, paying salaries to government workers on time — will not be so
easily identiﬁed as manipulation when citizens have limited experience with democracy (and “election-
year” economics), as well as facing large structural changes . As voters gain more experience with
the democratic system and as information improves, using ﬁscal policy to “grease the wheels” of the
economic system may be increasingly less eﬀective in aﬀecting public perceptions, and hence may be
less likely to occur. That is, an old democracy may be fragile, but the public’s experience means that
ﬁscal manipulation will be seen as such and hence be ineﬀective.
The distinction between newness and fragility of democracy leads to another distinction, namely
between use of ﬁscal policy in critical periods to try to show that the system works and genuine reform.
The general view is that new democracies can survive social strife and economic instability for some
years, but are likely to break down in the medium to long run unless they can address problems
of poverty and inequality through reforms that provide the basis for sustainable growth. Our focus
on the role of ﬁscal policy in reducing the vulnerability of democracy to breakdown should not be
read as contradicting this view. Quite the contrary. Our argument is applied to new democracies,
rather than any fragile democracy, precisely because we believe that such policies can only be eﬀective
when the democratic regime is young, after which ﬁscal manipulation will be seen as such and hence
will not reduce (and may well increase) the vulnerability of democracy to breakdown. In this paper
our motivation is positive, not normative, in exploring the implications of newness for ﬁscal policy.
Expenditures to show the system works are not a substitute for true reform; they may be a temporary
attempt to bridge a particularly crucial breakpoint of democracy.
3A F r a m e w o r k o f A n a l y s i s
We now turn to modeling the relation between ﬁscal policy and fragility of democracy. We ask
how ﬁscal policy may be diﬀerent in new than established democracies because democracy is not
fully consolidated when it is only recently adopted. We focus on the eﬀect of economic policy on
inducing support for democracy via the probability that citizens assign to democracy being superior
to nondemocracy, rather than on the utility they associate with one system or the other. That is,
we view the key problem that citizens face as an inference problem of deciding whether democracy
“works”, depending on their observation of economic outcomes. Government expenditures can there-
7fore increase public support for democracy primarily by inducing citizen’s to increase the probability
they assign to democracy “working”. This does not mean that citizens have not formed beliefs about
democracy but that, given their attitudes, their willingness to support (defend) democracy would
depend on their perception of its ability to deliver a functioning economy in the particular country.
We present a simple two-period example (embedded in a multi-period model) in which the two
periods diﬀer in the vulnerability of democracy to collapse. To make the eﬀect of democratic fragility
on ﬁscal policy quite sharp, for the bulk of the paper we assume that spending on items that will
aﬀect public perception of democracy is the only type of expenditure the government has. While such
assumption is clearly unrealistic, it means that any diﬀerence in ﬁscal policy that the model predicts
for new versus established democracies is due to the government’s attempt to consolidate democracy.
In section 3.4.2 we add another type of government spending to help illustrate the determinants of
the magnitude of expenditures that aﬀect public attitudes.
We assume that in established democracies, ﬁscal policy is fully observed, consistent with the view
that information about ﬁscal policy is better once citizens (and the media) have more experience with
democracy and there is greater transparency in policymaking. In contrast, consistent with the view
that citizens in new democracies lack experience with democracy and have imperfect information
about ﬁscal policy, we assume that citizens in a new democracy do not observe spending on items
that will aﬀect public perception of democracy, which we denote ht. (Alternatively, citizens cannot
infer whether ht is substituting for other types of spending or is ﬁnanced by a deﬁcit, or cannot
infer the eﬀect of ht on outcomes.) We do however allow that they assign some probability that the
government is spending to aﬀect citizen perceptions, that is, that ht > 0.
The sequence of events in a period is as follows. In each period, the government chooses ht,a f t e r
which an event Zt is realized. The probability of a good outcome of the event is increasing in ht.O n
the basis of the outcome of this event, citizens update their beliefs about the eﬃcacy of democracy, as
summarized by a common posterior probability Pt that democracy is generally “good” for economic
outcomes (democracy “works”). Key to the updating is the belief of citizens that even if democracy is
not good for economic outcomes in general (and there is no government manipulation via ht), a good
outcome may be observed (and conversely) so that the outcome of a given event is not conclusive
on the eﬃcacy of democracy. Given the distribution of utilities associated with their perceptions of
democracy and autocracy in the population, the probability Pt induces support for democracy by a
fraction φt of the citizenry, where φt is increasing in Pt. Based on φt, anti-democratic elites decide
whether to stage a coup, where the likelihood of a coup succeeding is decreasing in φt (which will
8imply that the probability σt of survival of democracy is increasing in φ.) If democracy survives, a
similar set of decisions is made in the second period. If not, the economy becomes a non-democracy
in the second period.
3.1 Citizens’ Perceptions of Democracy
3.1.1 Individual utility
We assume that citizens diﬀer from one another in the utility they assign to diﬀerent regimes:
democracy believed to be superior to nondemocracy for economic outcomes; democracy believed to
be inferior to the (previous) non-democratic regime for economic outcomes; and, nondemocracy.
Ac i t i z e ni’s expected utility in any period t may be written
Ui (·) ≡ σt
£
PtV Gi
t +( 1− Pt)V Bi
t
¤
+( 1− σ)V Ai
t (1)
where σt is the probability that democracy survives in period t, V Gi
t is i’s expected welfare under
democracy in t if he believes democracy “works”, V Bi
t is his expected welfare under democracy in t if
he believes democracy doesn’t “work”, V Ai
t is his expected welfare under autocracy (non-democracy),
and Pt is the probability that citizens assign to democracy “working” based on outcomes in t.
Since our focus is on aﬀecting beliefs about whether democracy is good for outcomes (rather than
utility conditional on a given belief), we assume for simplicity that V Gi
t and V Bi
t are given and cannot
be aﬀected by government policy. The dependence of σ and P on h will be discussed below. For
simplicity the discount rate is assumed to equal 0.
3.1.2 The individual decision rule
A citizen’s only decision is whether or not to support democracy. Non-support may take many
forms: not voting; demonstrating against democracy or the government; not opposing coup attempts,
or even general civil unrest induced by skepticism about the political and economic regime.
Citizen i supports democracy in t i fa n do n l yi f
PtV Gi
t +( 1− Pt)V Bi
t ≥ V Ai
t (2)
The crucial, but reasonable assumption is that V Gi
t >V Ai
t >V Bi
t for at least some citizens i.( I f
V Bi ≥ V Ai, then a citizen supports democracy for sure for any value of P. If this holds for all i,
then all citizen support democracy no matter what is inferred about P, so that democracy is fully
consolidated.)
9Equation (2) with equality deﬁnes a critical value ˆ Pi for citizen i such that he supports democracy
in t if
Pt ≥ ˆ Pi
t ≡
V Ai
t − V Bi
t
V Gi
t − V Bi
t
(3)
and does not support if Pt < ˆ Pi
t. We note the possibility that the values of V Gi
t ,V Ai
t ,a n dV Bi
t may
evolve over time as people become more experienced with democracy. Speciﬁcally if V Gi
t is rising as
a democracy matures while V Ai
t is falling for all individuals, then the citizen-speciﬁcc r i t i c a lv a l u e ˆ Pi
t
will fall over time, so that support for democracy will rise over time for any inferred Pt.F o rs i m p l i c i t y
of exposition, we do not pursue this idea in the current paper and take V Gi,V Ai,a n dV Bi, and hence
ˆ Pi as time-invariant.8
3.1.3 The basic inference problem for P
Since citizens update their prior on the unobserved eﬃcacy of democracy on the basis of observed
economic outcomes, a natural framework is to use is Bayesian updating. Suppose that individuals
form the posterior Pt that democracy “works” (“salaries and allowances are paid”, “electricity gets
delivered”, etc.) using Bayes’ rule on the basis of observed economic performance and their prior
belief. In an unconsolidated democracy, where the prior Pt−1 < 1, observed outcomes may lead to an
updating of beliefs. We consider a simple “2x2” example, but this can be easily extended to multiple
outcomes or levels of democracy.
Consider an “event” Zt that can have two outcomes: a “good” outcome Zt = S and a “bad”
outcome Zt = X where we interpret “events” or “outcomes” not simply as general macroeconomic
outcomes, but as speciﬁc events, such as government meeting its ﬁnancial obligations. As indicated
above, a good outcome may be observed even if democracy is not generally good for outcomes.
Hence, let γt =P r ( Zt = S |democracy “works”) and βt =P r ( Zt = S |democracy doesn’t “work”),
where 1 >γ>β>0. Suppose that the true probability of observing a good outcome is δ where
γ ≥ δ>β .9
To characterize the results of the representative citizen’s inference problem, consider ﬁrst two polar
cases for individual knowledge of the process generating outcomes. The ﬁr s ti st h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n ti s
8In general, one may expect that support for democracy will increase over time, if for no other reason than a
demographic change so that as older citizens used to the previous non-democratic regime die, a larger fraction of
individuals support democracy. This is consistent with the ﬁndings reported in Figure 1.
9It is a less than fully settled question on whether democracy produces better economic outcomes than non-
democracies (for example, on relative growth performance of democracies and nondemocracies, as in Tavares and
Wacziarg [2001]) However, our conceptual results do not depend on what in fact is the probability of a “good” outcome
under democracy as long as in a new democracy: 1) citizens are not convinced of the eﬃcacy of democracy and hence
face an inference problem as posited; and, 2) the government has some ability to manipulate outcomes.
10not manipulating outcomes. Denote by Pt (·|Zt;v) the posterior Pt that democracy is good conditional
on the observed outcome Zt and a probability v that outcomes are manipulated. The posterior that
democracy is good for outcomes when citizens place 0 probability on manipulation and observe Zt
m a yt h e nb ew r i t t e n :
Pt (·|Zt = S;0) =
Pt−1γt
Pt−1γt +( 1− Pt−1)βt
(4a)
Pt (·|Zt = X;0) =
Pt−1 (1 − γt)
Pt−1 (1 − γt)+( 1− Pt−1)(1− βt)
(4b)
where Pt−1 is the probability assigned to democracy being good for outcomes prior to observing the
event S or X.
In the second polar case, individuals are certain that outcomes are (successfully) manipulated by
the government, modeled by assuming that individuals believe that outcome S occurs with probability
μ ≥ δ (and X occurs with probability 1 − μ) independent of whether democracy is actually good or
bad for outcomes. (We return to government behavior in manipulating outcomes in section 3.3.2). In
this case Bayesian updating in (4) gives the obvious result that the posterior is equal to the prior Pt−1
independent of the realization of the random variable Zt,t h a ti s ,Pt (·|Zt = S;1)=Pt (·|Zt = X;1)=
Pt−1.
When a democracy is new, so that individuals have less knowledge and understanding of the work-
ings of government, we assume that ht is imperfectly observed. We represent the degree of knowledge
of ﬁscal policy in a stylized way by assuming that with probability νt (that is, the probability that
individuals assign to ﬁscal policy being manipulated) the second case is relevant and the posterior is
simply the prior Pt−1, and with probability 1−νt the ﬁrst case is relevant, so that the posteriors are
given by (4). The posterior is then the weighted sum of the two cases, namely
Pt (·|Zt = S;ν)=
(1 − νt + νtPt−1)Pt−1γt + νtPt−1 (1 − Pt−1)βt
Pt−1γt +( 1− Pt−1)βt
(5a)
Pt (·|Zt = X;ν)=
(1 − νt + νtPt−1)Pt−1 (1 − γt)+νtPt−1 (1 − Pt−1)(1− βt)
Pt−1 (1 − γt)+( 1− Pt−1)(1− βt)
(5b)
From these equations it is clear that the posterior Pt (·|Zt = S;ν) is falling in ν, while Pt (·|Zt = X;ν)
is rising in ν, so that as information gets better, diﬀerence between posteriors conditional Zt = S
and Zt = X narrows.
Equations (4) have a number of basic implications. In an unconsolidated democracy (Pt−1 < 1)
a bad outcome will lower the posterior probability Pt that citizens assign to democracy being good
11for outcomes, while a good outcome will have the opposite eﬀect. The more individuals are aware
that manipulation may be taking place (the larger is ν), the smaller is this eﬀect. In an established
democracy where Pt−1 =1 , outcomes have no eﬀect on perceptions of or support for democracy.
This is the essence of the individual inference problem which will play a key role in determining
government’s choice of ﬁscal policy in a new democracy.
3.1.4 Public support for democracy
The common value Pt can then be translated into support for democracy in the population as
a whole. The distribution of values of V Gi,VBi, and V Ai in the population induces a distribution of




. For future use we denote by V G, V B,a n d
V A as population averages of the individual utility indicators V Gi,VBi, and V Ai.
The fraction of citizens φt who support democracy at t for a value Pt is then simply
φt ≡ F (Pt) (6)
that is, the fraction of citizens with ˆ Pi ≤ Pt. In a consolidated democracy, where Pt =1 , all citizens
have ˆ Pi ≤ Pt and φt =1 . The key observation here is that in an unconsolidated democracy with
Pt < 1, the higher is Pt the greater is the fraction φt of citizens who support democracy.
3.2 Survival of Democracy
How is citizen support of democracy connected to democratic survival? It seems natural to
argue that the probability that democracy survives at any point in time, call it σt,i si n c r e a s i n gi n
the fraction φ of citizens who support democracy. It would be nonsensical to argue that the chances
of democratic survival are decreasing in φ. Hence, the essential point is that the probability that
democracy survives, that is, that there is not a reversion to autocracy, is not independent of public
support for democracy. This may seem obvious as well, though focussing solely on anti-democratic
elites in discussing problems of democratic consolidation implicitly assumes that public support for
democracy is not an important factor.
3.2.1 Anti-Democratic Elites
T om a k et h ea r g u m e n tm o r es p e c i ﬁc, we consider an antidemocratic elite, which will attempt
to overthrow democracy if it believes such an attempt is in its interest. What stops the elite from
attempting to overthrow democracy is the perception of low probability of success (and high cost of
failure), where probability of success is inversely related to φ, the fraction of the public who support
12democracy.10 Hence, democracy survives if the elite ﬁnds it preferable not to attempt to overthrow
it when comparing the expected costs and beneﬁts of trying to overthrow it, or when a attempted
coup is unsuccessful.
More formally, consider the decision problem of the elites. Denote by ξt the probability of suc-
cessful overthrow in period t,w h e r e
ξt = ξ (φt,t) (7)
where
∂ξ
∂φ < 0. The time argument in the function ξ (φt,t) reﬂects our argument that the threat
to democracy for a given value of φ, need not be identical at all points in time. This is a simple
representation of our point above that the vulnerability of democracy will vary over time.
The elite will not attempt a coup at t i fa n do n l yi f
WD ≥ ξ (φt,t)WA +( 1− ξ (φt,t))WFC (8)
where WD is the welfare of the elite under democracy, WA is their welfare under nondemocracy
(“autocracy”), and WFC is their welfare under a failed coup. We assume that WA >W D >W FC.
If (8) is satisﬁed, democracy survives in period t with probability 1. If it is not satisﬁed, the anti-
democratic elite attempt a coup and democracy survives with probability 1 − ξ (φt,t).W e a s s u m e
that lim
φ→1
ξ (·,t)=ξ < WD−WFC
WA−WFC, so that when φt =1 , no coup is attempted.
The probability σt that democracy survives in period t is then given by
σ (φt,t)=1 if φt ≥ ˆ φt (9a)
σ (φt,t)=1− ξ (φt,t) if φt < ˆ φt (9b)





< 1. (That is, for φt ≥ ˆ φt, no coup will be attempted.) In a consoli-
dated democracy in which citizens are convinced that democracy is “good” (that is, Pt−1 = Pt =1 ),
this belief implies that φt =1 . Hence, ξ = ξ, no coup will be attempted, and σt ≡ 1.I n a n e w
democracy the value of σt will depend on the realized value of φt which in turn depends on Pt and
government policy aﬀecting attitudes.
Condition (8) and the implied survival probabilities (9) may be used to summarize diﬀerent
10This argument may be made in any democracy, new or old, fragile or consolidated. That is, in a consolidated
democracy, anti-democratic elements may have the desire to substitute a democratic system with an alternative that
favors them, but realize that public support for democracy is suﬃciently strong, that any attempt to do so is fruitless
and hence is not attempted. This is fully consistent with Linz and Stepan’s ‘only game in town’ deﬁn i t i o ng i v e ni nt h e
introduction,
13approaches to studying consolidation of democracy that our model can represent. In our approach,
we take the WJ (J = D,A,FC) and the function ξ (·,t) as given and consider policies that raise
φt,t h u sr a i s i n gσ(φt,t). A focus on “buying oﬀ” elites, as in the work of Acemoglu and Robinson
discussed above, could be thought of as taking φt as given and considering policies that raise WD.
A third focus could be on institutional change that would shift the function ξ (·,t) by making coups
harder to mount, for example, greater civilian control of the army. It could also represent the evolution
of political institutions that lowers the ability of elites to achieve their aims. Note further that by
introducing dependence of ξ on φ, our model can also consider the evolution of the probability of
democratic survival σ due to demographic changes that change φt over time (such as steady increase
in the fraction of the population with no experience with the old regime), distinct from a changed
position of elites or in institutions.
The possibility of “nesting” diﬀerent approaches to consolidation in our model has a number
of advantages. It makes clear that our approach focussing on aﬀecting public attitudes towards
democracy is complementary to approaches that focus on placating the elites or on institutional
change. Moreover, it can allow theoretical and perhaps ultimately empirical comparison of diﬀerent
approaches.
3.3 Government
To derive the probability of the survival of democracy in a new, unconsolidated democracy in each
period, we consider government’s choice of ht and its eﬀect on the public’s beliefs.
3.3.1 The government budget constraint
The government is assumed to choose ﬁscal policy subject to an intertemporal budget constraint
kt + y = ht + kt+1 (10)
where kt represents assets carried over from the previous period and y is per-period ﬂow income.
To model most simply the eﬀect of diﬀerences in σt across periods, we consider two periods (say
t =1 ,2)i nw h i c hσ1 6= σ2, where the budget must be balanced over the two periods. That is, if the
government is not overthrown in a coup, we require it to bequeath to the t =3government the same
assets it received in period 1, i.e., k3 = k1, which is exogenously given. We assume that citizens in
new democracies observe neither ht directly, nor can they infer it. This is consistent with the view
(discussed further below) that in a new democracy citizens have quite imperfect information about
14ﬁscal policy, especially around election years.
3.3.2 Aﬀecting perceptions in a new democracy
As indicated, the key characteristic of a new democracy in which democracy is not fully consol-
idated is that the government can devote resources to increasing the probability of a good outcome
of event Z, that is, showing “democracy works”. We model this simply by assuming that when the
government spends ht, the probability of a good economic outcome S is μ(ht),w h e r eμ0 (h) > 0 and
μ00 (h) < 0 (and the probability of the outcome X is 1−μ(ht)) For simplicity of exposition, we assume
that the eﬀect of h on μ does not depend on ν, the probability assigned to the government using h,
which inﬂuences instead the posterior P formed on observing a good outcome.11
For modeling simplicity, we have assumed that all citizens are inﬂuenced by the same expenditures
in forming their inferences about democracy. In practice, diﬀerent citizens will be aﬀected by diﬀerent
programs. This may reﬂect numerous factors — geographic diﬀerences, rural versus urban allocations,
and the socioeconomic, demographic, and ethnic distribution of the population. Since our basic
argument may be illustrated using only a single type of expenditure, we have abstracted from this
consideration in the model, but we return to the possible empirical signiﬁcance of this point in section
3.4.2 below.
One may then use μ(ht) to derive the probability that citizens assign to democracy being good
conditional on the government’s choice of ht,n a m e l y :
Pt(ht)=μ(ht)Pt (·|Zt = S;ν)+( 1− μ(ht))Pt (·|Zt = X;ν) > 0 (11)
(This may be expanded using (5)) Since Pt (·|Zt = S;ν) >P t (·|Zt = X;ν) and μ0 (h) > 0, Pt (ht) in
(11) is monotonically increasing in h. Using (7), (6), and (11), we may then deﬁne the probability of
survival of democracy at any point as a function of ht by
σ (ht,t) ≡ 1 − ξ [F (Pt(ht)),t]
Since Pt (ht) is monotonically increasing in h,t h eC D FF (Pt) is monotonically increasing in Pt,
and ξ (φt,t) is monotonically decreasing in φt,w eh a v eσh (h,t) > 0. We will further assume that
11An alternative would be that higher h increases ν by making it more likely that manipulation of outcomes would
be observed. This would serve to reduce the eﬀectiveness of increases in h on aﬀecting attitudes, giving an explicit basis
for the assumption that μ
00 (h) < 0.




which will be crucial below. Characteristics of σ (h,t) and σh (h,t) as h approaches either 0 or ∞
may be derived from the underlying functions μ(·), F (·),a n dξ (·,t).12
3.3.3 The government’s choice problem
Let the government’s present discounted welfare in any period t in which they start with yt be
Ω(yt) if in oﬃce and Ψ if thrown out of oﬃce in a coup. Given the probability σ (ht,t) of surviving
until period t +1we may write
Ω(y + kt)=σ (ht,t)Ω(y + kt+1)+( 1− σ (ht,t))Ψ (13)
which over periods 1 and 2 may be written (using the intertemporal budget constraint (10) as:
Ω(y + k1)=( 1− σ (k1 − k2,1))Ψ + σ (k1 − k2,1)((1 − σ (k2 − k3,2))Ψ + σ(k2 − k3,2)Ω(y + k3))
(14)
The government’s choice problem is how to allocate resources to “protect” democracy over the two
periods, that is, what is the optimal value of k2. Using the constraint that the budget is balanced
over the two periods so that k3 = k1,o n eo b t a i n saﬁrst order condition
dΩ(y1)
dy2
= σh [·,1]Ψ − σh [·,1](σ [·,2]Ω(y3)+( 1− σ [·,2])Ψ)+σ [·,1]σh [·,2](Ω(y3) − Ψ)=0 (15)







We now consider what are the implications of (16) for the pattern of ht.
3.4 The pattern of ﬁscal policy in a new democracy
12Assume that as lim
h→∞
μ =1so that Pt(ht = ∞)=Pt (·|Zt = S;ν).L e t F [Pt (·|Zt = S;ν)] = ¯ φ ≤ ˆ φ,s ot h a t
lim
h→∞
σ (ht,t)=¯ σ ≤ 1 and σ (ht,t) < ¯ σ for ht < ∞.W h e n h =0then the probability of observing S is δ implying
Pt(0) = δPt (·|Zt = S;ν)+( 1− δ)Pt (·|Zt = X;ν).L e t F [Pt(0)] = φ ≥ 0,s ot h a tlim
h→0
σ(ht,t)=σ > 0. Finally, we








16We ask how the attempt to aﬀect public perceptions of democracy to prevent democratic collapse
will aﬀect the pattern of ﬁscal policy relative to an old democracy. When democracy is consolidated
so that Pt =1 , φt = σt =1regardless of the value of ht, so that there is no need for ht > 0.I nal o n g -
standing but still fragile democracies (where Pt−1 < 1), we argued that because of voters’ experience
with ﬁscal policy and “election-year economics” attempts to manipulate economic outcomes will be
perceived as such and hence unsuccessful. (In terms of equations (5), if manipulation takes place
it will observed with probability v =1 ,s ot h a tPt = Pt−1.) Hence, in the reference case of an old
democracy, h1 = h2 =0 .
3.4.1 The timing of ﬁscal expenditures
Critical points of democratic vulnerability
If the probability of democratic survival is the same across periods, that is, if σ (·,1) = σ (·,2),
then (16) implies h1 = h2. The condition that lim
h→0
σ0 (ht,t)=∞ (see footnote 12) implies that
h1 = h2 > 0, but there will be no cycle in ﬁscal expenditures.
Suppose instead that there is a lower probability of survival in the ﬁrst period, that is, σ (h,1) <
σ (h,2) for any h. Moreover, assume that the elasticity of σ (h,1) with respect to h is higher than







for all h, meaning roughly a greater sensitivity of survival to h in period 1 than 2. Hence, period 1
may be seen as a “critical” period.
One should note that the inequality (17) needn’t arise from diﬀerences in the eﬀect of ht on
σ (ht,t), that is, from diﬀerences in the ﬁrst derivative σh (ht,t).E v e n i f σh (h,1) = σh (h,2),a
lower level of σ (h,t),t h a ti s ,σ(h,1) <σ (h,2) for any h will imply that (17) holds. In words,
even if expenditures have the same eﬀect on survival probabilities across periods, a lower survival
probability in one period than the other for given expenditures will imply a higher level of h in the
more vulnerable period.
The concavity of σ (ht,t) in ht implies (see (12) above) that when (17) characterizes the diﬀerence
between σ (h,1) and σ(h,2),t h eﬁrst-order condition (16) can only be satisﬁed for h1 >h 2 > 0.T h a t
is, higher vulnerability of democracy implies higher ﬁscal expenditures to aﬀect public attitudes about
democracy.
Political Budget Cycles
Based on data on the incidence of democratic collapse in new democracies in election versus non-
17election years (see section 4.1 below), we argue that periods around elections are periods of highest
vulnerability of democracy. This seems logical since elections are often focal points for democratic
discontent.
The association of election years with critical points of democratic vulnerability has a simple
but important implication, namely the existence of political budget cycles in new democracies due
solely to the fragility of democracy (and that wouldn’t arise in old democracies). That is, in new
democracies, ﬁscal policy will be characterized by higher expenditures in election than non-election
years. The greater the diﬀerential in democratic vulnerability, the larger the political budget cycle.
Association of points of high vulnerability with election years raises the question of the eﬀect of
ht on re-election probabilities. Formally, the model could be seen as embodying the assumption that
re-election is certain, that is, that the only reason an incumbent would lose oﬃce between t =1and
t =2is a coup. Allowing there to be an exogenous probability ρ<1 of re-election at the end of t =1
would not change the basic conceptual argument. It would increase the beneﬁt to the incumbent of
h1 relative to h2 since even if no coup occurs at the end of t =1 , the incumbent is in oﬃce in t =2
only with probability ρ<1.@13
A more basic question is whether the re-election probability ρ would be aﬀected by expenditures
ht. This would confound the association of ht with political budget cycles as derived above, since
h1 >h 2 could reﬂect either higher vulnerability of democracy in election years or simply the attempt
of the incumbent to win re-election (coupled with the belief that higher expenditures increase the
chances of re-election). However, in Brender and Drazen (2005b) we ﬁnd that expansionary ﬁscal
policy does not help an incumbent in a new democracy get re-elected (and actually signiﬁcantly lowers
re-election probabilities in old democracies). Hence, were we to include re-election probabilities in the
model explicitly, the most defensible assumption empirically is that the incumbent cannot inﬂuence
his chances of winning a regular competitive election via ﬁscal policy, speciﬁcally by ht. Conceptually,
one may argue that ht aﬀects σ but not ρ b e c a u s et ob ee ﬀective, it must be directed at group wider
than swing or core voters. That is, were the incumbent to target ht for electoral eﬀectiveness, it
might be seen by the public in general as conﬁrming its skepticism about democracy and hence be
counter productive.
3.4.2 The size of ﬁscal expenditures
13If ρ<1 this should also aﬀectboth ND and OD, while h is relevant only in ND. Hence, if we observe PBC only
in ND, it is likely to reﬂect h (especially given our ﬁndings on re-election). This is supported by Brender and Drazen’s
(2005b) ﬁnding that the probability of re-election in ND is larger (or at least not smaller) than in OD.
18A key question concerns the size of the diﬀerence between h1 and h2,t h a ti s ,o ft h ed i ﬀerence
between expenditures to aﬀect attitudes about democracy in periods of high versus low democratic
variability. This will clearly depend on the characteristics of the function σ (ht,t) across time. The
larger is the diﬀerence in the elasticity of σ (ht,t) between two periods, the larger will be the diﬀerence
in ht between the two periods.
T h es i z eo fht depends on the characteristics of the function σ (ht,t) and its determinants. More
speciﬁcally, the level and sensitivity of ξ, the probability of a successful overthrow of democracy as
perceived by the elites, to φ, support for democracy by the masses, is important. A low level of
φ (that is, a high level of ξ) in the absence of government action, as well as a low sensitivity of ξ
to φ (so that a large increase in φ is needed to reduce ξ signiﬁcantly) will lead to higher level of
expenditures h. Intuitively, if the public begins with a weak belief in democracy and this implies that
anti-democratic elements think an anti-democratic coup has a large chance of success, government
expenditure on consolidation will be high.
A second determinant is the sensitivity of good versus bad outcomes to ﬁscal policy is crucial. In
terms of our speciﬁc model, how does the probability μ that a good outcome will be observed rise as
expenditure h increases? Intuitively, how costly is it for the regime to produce good outcomes, that
is, outcomes that will induce citizens to support democracy? In practice this would depend, inter
alia, on the magnitude of the problems facing the economy before the election year and on “luck” -
e.g., global developments. A negative external shock - such as a global slowdown or an increase in
import prices - after democratization would make it more diﬃcult - and costly - for the government
to persuade the public that democracy can coexist with a functioning economy. Though we did not
model it, a crucial characteristic of new democracies as shown in Tables 1 and 1A is that voters
do not see ﬁscal policy directed toward this end as manipulative. To the extent they learn about
election-year manipulation, this sort of ﬁscal policy will be ineﬀective and hence less likely to be used.
A third determinant would be alternative uses of resources within a period when democracy is at
risk. To better see the eﬀect of this, return to the model of section 3.3.3 and suppose that ﬁrst-period
income may also be spent on g1 that aﬀect government (or public) utility directly. Suppose the
government’s objective, instead of (14) were to maximize
Ω(y + k1)=u(g1)+( 1− σ(h1,1))Ψ + σ (h1,1)((1 − σ (k2 − k3,2))Ψ + σ (k2 − k3,2)Ω(y3)) (18)
subject to
y + k1 = h1 + g1 + k2 (19)
19One would obtain a ﬁrst-order condition for k2 which would be identical to (15) implying that h1 and
h2 should be chosen to equalize
σh(ht,t)
σ(ht,t) across periods (implying that h1 = h2 if σ (·,1) = σ (·,2)). In
addition one would obtain a ﬁrst-order condition for g1,n a m e l y
σh [·,1]σ[·,2](Ω(k3) − Ψ)=u0 (g1) (20)
determining the level of “regular utility-producing” expenditures g1 relative to “attitude-aﬀecting”
expenditures h1. The thing to notice from (20) is that given σ (ht,t), the higher is Ω(k3) − Ψ the
lower will be g1 and hence the higher will be h1 (and h2). This should be clear intuitively. Ω(k3)−Ψ
is the present discounted value of being in oﬃce in t =2versus having been removed in a coup. The
larger this is, the more resources – that is, the greater the fraction of the overall budget – will be
devoted to expenditures aimed at remaining in oﬃce. Put another way, the greater is the cost of
being deposed in a coup (the larger is Ψ in absolute value), the larger will be expenditures meant to
retain oﬃce. If the cost to a leader of being deposed in a coup is very large, as it may well be when
democracy is quite new, expenditures ht to retain oﬃce may be quite large.
To conclude this section, the magnitude of expenditures to consolidate democracy depend of
course on where they are directed. This is a further reason for looking at expenditures directed at
the masses and not solely (or primarily) at the elites (which of course may be part of the process of
democratic consolidation). To go a step further, we would argue that expenditures directed at elites
would not be of suﬃcient magnitude to explain the magnitude of ﬁscal eﬀect we discuss in the next
section.14
4 Some Supportive Evidence
We now present a number of ﬁndings about new democracies that are consistent with our ap-
proach and that we think are supportive of our arguments on ﬁscal implications of democratic fragility
in new democracies.
4.1 Election years as points of vulnerability
Our discussion of the problem of democratic consolidation suggests that in new democracies
ﬁscal policy responds especially at certain “critical points” at which democracy may be especially
14We note however that when buying oﬀ elites is seen as critical to democracy surviving, the amount that needs to
be given to elites to secure their support need not be proportional or correlated with their size. That is, a very powerful
elite may be able to extract a disproportionate amount of resources from the government in order that they to secure
their support for the regime.
20vulnerable. One such point is probably around elections. It is not simply that dissatisfaction can
be expressed at ballot box, but also, almost “by deﬁnition” the democratic system is being tested at
election time: a leader may cancel elections; turnover of parliament is time of mechanical fragility.
In fact whether the ﬁrst elections take place after the transition to democracy is generally seen as
crucial to the legitimacy of a newly democratic system (See, for example, O’Donnell and Schmitter
(1986) and Linz and Stepan(1978).)
In Table 2, we present the probability of democracy collapsing in both new and old democracies.
We see that democracy is almost three times more likely to collapse in election years than non-election
years in new democracies. It is also evident from the table that in old democracies the probability
of a collapse of the democratic regime is very small, with similar values in election and non-election
years.
[Put Table 2 Here]
4.2 Election-year eﬀects in new and old democracies
If democratic fragility induces signiﬁcant expenditures to help consolidate democracy at times
of democratic vulnerability, then this should show up in the data. To the extent that these points of
especially high vulnerability are election years, we should observe a political budget cycle with ex-
penditures being higher in election than non-election years, though such an eﬀe c tw o u l dn o tr e p r e s e n t
electoral manipulation in the standard sense. The absence of problems of democratic consolidation
in old democracies (or the ineﬀectiveness of expenditures in aﬀecting beliefs about democracy), com-
bined with the absence of any apparent diﬀerence in the likelihood of democratic collapse between
election and non-election years suggests that there should be no similar eﬀect in old democracies.
In Brender and Drazen (2005a), we ﬁnd that increases in the government expenditures and deﬁcits
(relative to GDP) in election years take place predominantly in new democracies, with no statistically
signiﬁcant cycle in older democracies as a group.15 In the period 1960-2001, the election year in
the ﬁrst elections (up to the ﬁrst four) after the transition to democracy in 36 new democracies is
characterized by an increase in public expenditure and the deﬁc i to f0 . 8 %o fG D P .I nc o n t r a s t ,i n
elections after the ﬁrst four, as well as in established democracies, there is no statistically signiﬁcant
increase in the deﬁcit relative to non-election years. We reproduce in Table 3 the ﬁrst table of our
earlier paper, showing this result. In the earlier paper, we also show that the signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between new and established democracies remains even after controlling for the level of democracy,
15“New” democracies in our paper refered to up to the ﬁrst four elections in a country after the transition to democracy,
whereas elections after the ﬁrst four are taken to refer to old or established democracies.
21the level of economic development, endogeneity of election dates, the electoral system and whether a
country has a Presidential or a Parliamentary system.
[Put Table 3 Here]
Of course the ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant election-year eﬀect on government expenditures in new but
not old democracies does not prove that these expenditures are motivated by the desire to prevent
reversion to non-democracy at a critical point. However, Brender and Drazen (2005b) look at voter
response to deﬁcit spending in new democracies over the period 1960-2003 and ﬁnd no evidence that
high government expenditures or deﬁcits aﬀect the probability that the incumbent gets re-elected.
In Table 4 we present some of the results from that paper. The point of the table is that while there
is a signiﬁcant increase in central government expenditures in election years, they do not serve to
help an incumbent’s re-election. This suggests that the election-year increase in government spending
reported in Table 3 reﬂects something other than the attempt to improve re-election prospects.16
[Put Table 4 Here]
4.3 The composition of election-year expenditures
Unfortunately, in a large panel it is impossible to disaggregate the data to the level where one
c a ni d e n t i f ye x p e n d i t u r e sa sc l e a r l ya i m e da ta ﬀecting public attitudes about democracy. One can
however ask whether the data are consistent with high election-year expenditures in new democracies
going primarily to elites or being spread more broadly. Towards this end we looked at the cases
of the large increases in election-year government spending in new democracies to get a sense of
where expenditures are going. This is summarizedi nT a b l e5 ,w h e r ew el o o ka tt h ec o m p o s i t i o n
of the increase in expenditures in the election year in the 20 new democracies that had the largest
such increase in the sample used by Brender and Drazen (2005a). Countries are ordered by the
overall growth in expenditure in the election year (in percent of GDP) relative to the previous year,
indicated by the number in parentheses after the election date. For each country the table compares
the fraction of the increase in public expenditures that was due to each of 4 spending categories
(with the share of each category in total spending in the year before the election in the left-hand
column in each category). A larger ﬁg u r ei nt h er i g h t - h a n dc o l u m nt h a ni nt h el e f t - h a n dc o l u m ni n
each category indicates a more than proportional share of that item in the election-year spending
expansion. Overall, it seems that the increase in public spending in election years tended to be
proportional to the composition of spending before the election year with the share of social spending
16We ﬁnd unconvincing the argument that these increases reﬂect incumbents’ attempts to inﬂuence voters, but they
are repeatedly unsucessful.
22(welfare transfer payments, education and health) unchanged on average.17 The detailed composition
of the increase in spending suggests that it was mostly transfer payments, agricultural subsidies to
restore food supplies, or payment of arrears to utility suppliers that accounted for the increased
spending in the election years. While not oﬀering an unequivocal proof, these expenditures can more
intuitively be classiﬁed as spending on the masses than on elites.
[Put Table 5 Here]
4.4 Fiscal manipulation
For high expenditures to be consistent with the government trying to show that “democracy
works”, we argued that they cannot be perceived as such. To buttress this claim, we argued that
ﬁscal manipulation is less observable in new democracies. A somewhat rough indication of this can be
drawn from Table 6. In this table we compare the data on public expenditure as reported in the IFS
in the year subsequent to the one for which the data are reported with the latest available data for the
same year.18 We ﬁnd that in new democracies the level of expenditure reported immediately after the
election year were 1.4 percent lower than ﬁnalized data; in non-election years, it was unchanged. In
contrast, in established democracies initial reports for election years were 0.1 percent lower than the
ﬁnal data, compared to their being 0.2 percent higher in non-election years. While a comprehensive
analysis of the diﬀerences in the quality of reporting in various groups of countries is beyond the
scope of this paper, these ﬁgures are suggestive that new democracies provide a lower quality of data
to their citizens in election years.
[Put Table 6 Here]
5 Concluding Comments
There are many countries where democracy is new and hence often not fully consolidated. The
purpose of this paper was to explore how the danger of a collapse of democracy may aﬀect ﬁscal policy
in comparison to countries where democracy is older and often more established. The question of
the implications of democratic fragility for economic policy has received considerable attention from
political scientists, though formal modeling is far more recent and less common. A common theme
of much of the literature is that elites play a crucial role both in the transition to democracy and in
the possibility of reversion of a democracy to autocracy. While this is uncontroversial, this view has
17The noticeable outlier Ethiopia reﬂects the combined eﬀects of the war with Eritrea and famine which required
higher military spending and agricultural subsidies.
18For example, we compare the data for Spain in 1982, as reported in the 1983 IFS, with the data for Spain in the
same year as reported in the 2005 IFS.
23lead many researchers to focus primarily on policies aimed at anti-democratic elites in consolidation
of democracy with far less attention paid to policies aimed at the mass of citizenry.
In this paper we concentrate on the citizenry and consider policy meant to aﬀect their attitudes
towards democracy, more speciﬁcally, at policy meant to convince a possibly skeptical citizenry that
“democracy works”. Our focus therefore is on the inference problem that citizens solve in looking at
economic outcomes and forming their beliefs about the eﬃcacy of democracy. Our interest is not in
analyzing very speciﬁc policies, but in the general implications of the need to address the concerns
of citizens for patterns of ﬁscal policy in new democracies. We argued that the implications of the
model are broadly consistent with the empirical patterns generally observed, including the existence
of political budget cycles in new democracies that are not observed in the aggregate budget level in
a panel of old democracies.
As discussed in section 3.2.1, our model can represent diﬀerent important approaches to studying
consolidation of democracy that are complementary to one another. It therefore suggests that these
approaches can be compared in a common framework which can be used to study the relative impor-
tance of the various factors aﬀecting the consolidation process in diﬀerent countries or episodes. We
hope this paper encourages further research in that direction.
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251 Values in the Figure are differences between citizens of new and old democracies in the response to positive statements about 
democracy.
Figure 1: The Difference in Attitudes Between 













































Freedom of speech is important Democracy is good













over age 64 Constant N
of which: new 
democracies Adj. R
2
Significance of economic performance:
  Growth is important 
2 0.049** -0.005*** -0.005* 0.007** 1.088*** 91 47 0.32
[0.028] [0.005] [0.073] [0.010] [0.000]
  Stable economic progress is important 
3 0.110*** -0.003 0.005 0.001 0.35 92 48 0.302
[0.000] [0.226] [0.152] [0.839] [0.108]
Attitudes toward democracy and politics:
  Democracy is good 
4 -0.171*** 0.006 -0.028*** 0.004 5.104*** 86 47 0.342
[0.004] [0.126] [0.001] [0.561] [0.000]
  Maintaining order is important 
5 0.077** -0.004* -0.005 0.006 0.703*** 137 62 0.144
[0.012] [0.062] [0.250] [0.120] [0.006]
  Freedom of speech is important 
6 -0.052*** 0.004*** -0.001 0 0.161 137 62 0.322
[0.001] [0.001] [0.718] [0.813] [0.223]
  Evaluation of democracy's progress 
7 -0.203** 0.018*** -0.041*** -0.013 5.087*** 50 26 0.519
[0.048] [0.002] [0.003] [0.299] [0.000]
  Superiority of democracy 
8 -0.208*** 0.006 -0.016* 0.005 4.257*** 85 47 0.319
[0.002] [0.179] [0.079] [0.517] [0.000]
Honesty and Government
  Cheating to get government benefits 
9 0.584*** 0.012 0.019 -0.042* 1.129 134 59 0.152
[0.000] [0.272] [0.437] [0.057] [0.431]
  Avoiding fares on public transport 
10 0.650*** -0.002 0.012 0.015 1.3 121 53 0.171
[0.000] [0.851] [0.603] [0.456] [0.321]
Following politics on the media 
11 0.215 -0.002 0.017 0.038** 1.158 48 23 0.205
[0.160] [0.787] [0.424] [0.047] [0.367]
1 Based on the mean responses of citizens'  in various countries to the World Values Survey (Inglehart (2004). The figures in the first row for each 
question are regression coefficients and the figures in the second row are P values.
2 The share of respondents stating that a "high level of economic growth" is one of the two most important goals their country should aim for in the * - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
4 The means of respondents' opinions of the democratic system as a way of governing their country. The possible answers (on a scale of 4) ranged 
from "very bad" to "very good".
7 The means of respondents' satisfaction with the progress of democracy in their country. The possible answers (on a scale of 4) ranged from "not at 
all satisfied" to "very satisfied".
8 The means of respondents' agreement with the statement "Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government". The 
possible answers (on a scale of 4) ranged from "strongly disagree" to "agree strongly".
pg g g p g y
next 10 years. The other options were "making sure that the country has strong defense forces", "seeing that people have more say about how things 
are done at their jobs and in their communities" and "trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful".
3 The share of respondents stating that a "stable economy" is one of the two most important goals their country should aim for in the next 10 years. 
The other options were "progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society", "progress toward a society in which ideas count more than 
money" and "the fight against crime".
5 The share of respondents stating that "maintaining order in the nation" is the most important goal their country should aim for in the next 10 years. 
The other options were "giving people more say in important government decisions", "fighting rising prices" and "protecting freedom of speech".
9 The means of respondents' opinions on how justifiable it is to claim government benefits to which one is not entitled. The possible answers (on a 
scale of 10) ranged from "never justifiable" to "always justifiable".
10 The means of respondents' opinions on how justifiable it is to avoid a fare on public transport. The possible answers (on a scale of 10) ranged from 
"never justifiable" to "always justifiable".
11 The means of respondents' answers to the question "How often do you follow politics in the news on television or on the radio or in the daily papers".
The possible answers (on a scale of 5) ranged from "never" to "every day".
6 The share of respondents stating that "protecting freedom of speech" is the most important goal their country should aim for in the next 10 years. The 

















Significance of economic performance:
  Growth is important
3 0.092*** -0.028*** -0.092*** 0.003*** 0.033***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
  Stable economic progress is important
3 0.315*** -0.015*** -0.133*** 0.005*** 0.024***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Attitudes toward democracy and politics:
  Democracy is good -0.098*** 0.009*** -0.057*** 0.000*** 0.023***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.000]
  Maintaining order is important
3 0.253*** -0.016*** -0.041*** 0.008*** 0.007***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
  Freedom of speech is important
3 -0.332*** 0.019*** -0.073*** -0.006*** 0.029***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
  Evaluation of democracy's progress -0.100*** 0.024*** -0.032*** -0.000** 0.008***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.034] [0.000]
  Superiority of democracy -0.207*** 0.007*** -0.040*** 0.001*** 0.011***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Honesty and Government
  Cheating to get government benefits 0.573*** 0.009*** -0.122*** -0.016*** -0.025***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
  Avoiding fares on public transport 0.566*** -0.017*** -0.126*** -0.021*** -0.018***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Following politics on the media 0.284*** -0.008*** -0.315*** 0.011*** 0.048***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
3 Probit equations.























2 The income level of the individual in his country on a scale of 1-10, where 1 is the lowest level.
1 Based on the responses of citizens' in various countries to the World Values Survey (Inglehart (2004). The detailed questions appear in Table 2. 
Controls also included the age composition of the country, marital status, employment status and religion (in a 7 groups distribution). The figures in the 



















Total No. of 
Observations
yes 8.5 3.0 37 0.4 0.7 10
no 91.5 97.0 974 99.6 99.3 1,419
yes 10.8 3.5 45 0.4 0.7 9
no 89.2 96.5 966 99.6 99.3 1,420
yes 12.3 3.9 50 0.4 1.2 16
no 87.7 96.1 961 99.6 98.8 1,413
Total Years 130 881 1,011 228 1,201 1,429
1Countries are defined as new democracies until the 4
th democratic election campaign.
3Defined as a decline of 5 or more points in the democracy/autocracy scale, starting with a positive level.
4Starting from a positive level.
2A downfall of a democracy is defined as a shift from a positive score in the democracy/autocracy scale in 
the POLITY IV dataset of the University of Maryland.




Sharp decline in 
the level of 
democracy
3
A decline of 2 or 
more points in 
the level of 
democracy
4Table 3: The Political Budget Cycle Across Countries, Fixed Effects Estimates.
Estimation period
Dependent variable
1 balance texp trg balance texp trg balance texp trg balance texp trg
Elect
2 -0.352*** 0.085 -0.251 -0.868*** 0.747** -0.153 -0.684** 0.434* -0.237 -0.109 -0.131 -0.223*
(0.123) (0.193) (0.171) (0.273) (0.292) (0.236) (0.290) (0.260) (0.247) (0.135) (0.146) (0.118)
Adjusted R
2 0.683 0.905 0.915 0.461 0.937 0.954 0.504 0.928 0.920 0.764 0.959 0.969
F- Statistic 47.96 211.63 239.87 9.42 150.57 203.18 11.62 140.19 120.61 94.937 693.30 928.81
DW Statistic 1.955 1.562 1.455 1.821 2.051 2.114 1.682 1.925 2.134 1.900 1.987 1.872
No. of countries 68 68 68 36 36 36 26 26 26 32 32 32
No. of obs. 1616 1631 1640 415 423 415 336 344 336 1105 1112 1128
Avg. time series length 23.8 24.0 24.1 11.5 11.8 11.5 13.0 13.3 13.0 34.5 34.8 35.3
2Elect - a dummy variable with the value 1 in the election year and 0 otherwise.
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
This table is Table 1 of Brender and Drazen (2005a). In that paper we also presented GMM estimates of these relations, with basically identical results. The 
covariates include one lag of the dependent variable, the log of per-capita GDP, the ratio of international trade to GDP, the fraction of the population over age 65, 
the fraction of the population between ages 15 and 64, and the log difference between real GDP and its (country specific) trend, estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott 
filter.
1Variable definitions (all in percent of GDP): balance-central government surplus; texp-total expenditure by the central government; trg-total revenue and grants of 
the central government. Standard errors are in the parentheses.
3The "new democracies" among the transition economies are listed in Table A-I of Brender and Drazen (2005a).
1960-2001 1960-2001 1960-2001 1960-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)





"Old Democracies"SURPLUS_term * old 
2 10.709**
[0.018]
SURPLUS_term * new_democracy 
2 0.559
[0.956]
SURPLUS_ey * old 
2 10.373*
[0.078]
SURPLUS_ey * new_democracy 
2 6.702
[0.361]
GDPPC_gr * old 
2 6.330
[0.170]














Table 4: The Effects of Budget Surpluses and Growth on the 
Probability of Reelection in New and Old Democracies
1
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; 
*** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
Dependent variable: Probability of Reelection
1
1 This table is taken from Brender and Drazen (2005b). The figures in the 
table are probit coefficients and the figures in the parentheses are P-
values. An asterisk (*) indicates multiplication by the binary variable that 
follows. new_democracy - A binary variable with a value of 1 for new 
democracies, old - A binary variable with a value of 1 for old democracies.
2 SURPLUS_term - The change in the ratio of the government deficit to 
GDP in the two years preceding the election year, relative to the two 
previous years. SURPLUS_ey -The change in the government deficit ratio 
to GDP In the election year, compared to the previous year. GDPPC_gr - 
The average growth rate of real per-capita GDP during the leader's current 
term.Table 5: The Composition of Expenditure Increases in Election Years
Country (Expenditure 
Growth in percent)
Expenditure in the year 
before the elections (out 
of total expenditure)
Fraction of total 
election-year 
expenditure growth 
accounted for by this 
category
Expenditure in the year 
before the elections (out 
of total expenditure)
Fraction of total election-
year expenditure growth 
accounted for by this 
category
Expenditure in the year 
before the elections (out 
of total expenditure)
Fraction of total 
election-year 
expenditure growth 
accounted for by this 
category
Expenditure in the year 
before the elections (out 
of total expenditure)
Fraction of total 
election-year 
expenditure growth 
accounted for by this 
category
Brazil_1989 (8.85) 31.3 37.4 4.1 -3.1 2.0 0.7 62.6 65.0
Turkey_1977 (7.91) 28.3 24.0 29.8 26.9 3.2 2.1 38.6 47.0
Greece_1981 (3.83) 51.6 66.3 7.2 0.0 5.3 14.5 36.0 19.2
Bolivia_1993 (3.76) 37.5 57.0 12.4 26.0 1.8 1.4 48.3 15.6
Turkey_1991 (3.62) 26.3 12.1 12.9 17.1 2.0 2.0 58.7 68.8
Hungary_2002 (3.56) 42.7 30.1 2.2 83.9 4.0 10.3 51.1 -24.2
Cyprus_1973 (3.47) 35.8 20.8 11.1 -5.2 14.8 62.1 38.3 22.2
Estonia_1995 (3.15)  59.6 -1.8 7.1 2.4 1.6 58.7 31.7 40.7
Spain_1982 (3.08) 68.8 104.7 3.4 9.6 3.3 1.5 24.4 -15.8
Ethiopia_1999 (2.67) 26.3 -22.6 12.0 10.5 8.1 42.9 53.5 69.2
Jamaica_1976 (2.59) 39.4 44.8 10.0 4.2 6.3 24.3 44.4 26.7
Cyprus_1983 (2.46) 41.8 14.4 4.7 24.1 14.4 26.6 39.1 35.0
Mongolia_1997 (2.44) 31.9 39.1 8.8 -4.4 2.2 3.0 57.2 62.2
Brazil_1998 (2.29) 57.5 89.7 1.7 0.2 2.6 1.6 38.2 8.4
Uruguay_1994 (1.96) 73.6 65.6 4.3 3.9 1.1 1.2 21.0 29.3
Fiji_1977 (1.90) 37.9 73.2 17.2 0.3 8.0 3.0 36.9 23.5
Argentina_1999 (1.59) 60.8 38.8 4.6 -4.1 0.9 -1.2 33.6 66.5
Nepal_1995 (1.53) 24.1 8.5 13.3 16.4 11.0 -4.5 51.6 79.6
Spain_1979 (1.50) 67.9 83.9 3.2 10.9 3.6 -5.9 25.3 11.1
Fiji_1982 (1.42) 31.6 52.3 26.3 1.2 6.5 0.2 35.5 46.2
Average 44.4 41.4 8.9 11.6 5.1 12.9 41.6 34.2
Social Expenditure: Education, Health, Social Security & Welfare, Housing & Community Amenities
Services and Infrastructure: Economic Services: Fuel & Energy, Transportation & Communication
Agriculture: Economic Services: Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting
Social Expenditure Services and Infrastructure Agriculture OtherTable 6: The Accuracy of Reported Expenditures in New and Old Democracies
1
All Years Election Years
Non-election 
Years
All Countries deviation -0.03 -0.42 0.11
Number of available years 561 150 411
New Democracies deviation -0.38 -1.43 -0.04
Number of available years 161 39 122
Old Democracies deviation 0.11 -0.06 0.17
Number of available years 400 111 289
Developed countries deviation 0.22 0.15 0.25
Number of available years 280 86 194
(In percent of the initially reported expenditures)
1 Figures are the difference between the first figure for the level of central government expenditure 
that appeared in the IFS within a year after the end of the reported fiscal year and the latest 
available figure for the same year. Countries that did not have a published figure in the IFS within a
year from the end of the fiscal year are excluded. A negative figure indicates that the initial figure 
was smaller than the final one.
Data cover the years 1960 -2000.